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Casenote
Sharp v. Norwood: New York Offers Little
Guidance on Whether Chronically Late
Rent Payments Constitute a "Nuisance"
I. Introduction
For numerous years, the Doctrine of Nuisance has been a
successful and steadfast shield available to tenants as they skir-
mish with the mighty sword brandished by landlords seeking to
extract rent payments. In Michman v. Rivera,' for example, the
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, stated that
"[iut shall be a valid defense ... to show existing violations in
the building.., which are dangerous, hazardous or detrimental
to life or health as a basis for nonpayment." 2 In Michman, the
tenants refused to pay their rent because, inter alia, the land-
lord failed to: (1) fix the broken hall banister and handrail; (2)
fix the defective fire escape; (3) provide the dwelling with a resi-
dent janitor; and (4) remove rubbish which accumulated in the
dumbwaiter shaft.3
In addition to defending against demands to pay rent, ten-
ants have also successfully used the Doctrine of Nuisance to en-
sure that landlords completely abate nuisances interfering with
the tenants' "use and enjoyment"4 of the premises. In Allison v.
Bay Realty Corp. ,5 the tenant's infant was found to have se-
verely elevated levels of lead in his blood.6 This finding was re-
ported to the Department of Health's Lead Prevention Program
1. 39 Misc.2d 347, 240 N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963).
2. Id. at 349, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
3. See id. at 349, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).
5. 172 Misc.2d 480, 660 N.Y.S.2d 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
6. See id. at 481, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
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which investigated and found numerous lead paint violations
throughout the building. 7 Shortly thereafter the Department of
Health issued an Order to Abate Nuisance8 to the landlord and
directed the landlord to correct the violations within five days. 9
Another tenant, facing possible "imminent peril" 10 because
her toilet was blocked, successfully forced the landlord to abate
the nuisance created by the stoppage." In 300 West 154th
Street Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings of the City of New
York,' 2 the tenant claimed that she repeatedly urged the land-
lord to fix her toilet. 13 When the landlord failed to make the
necessary repairs, the tenant contacted the City Department of
Buildings, which in turn was unsuccessful in its attempt to
have the landlord abate the nuisance. 14 Instead, the Depart-
ment of Buildings made the arrangements for the necessary re-
pair and ultimately billed the landlord for the costs.' 5
On the flip side, the Doctrine of Nuisance has been a
mighty tool for the landlord as well. In 1021-27 Avenue St.
John Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Hernandez,16 for ex-
ample, the landlord commenced a holdover proceeding seeking
to evict the tenant on the ground that the latter's drug use and
sale on the premises constituted a nuisance. 7 In Hernandez,
the landlord alleged that the tenant sold and used drugs in the
apartment. 8 Moreover, the landlord also claimed that the ten-
ant allowed "undesirables" to use his apartment in order to sell
7. See id.
8. See id. at 482, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 339. "The order informed [the landlord] that
a child with a blood lead level of 20 micrograms per deciliter or higher resided in
apartment 3-1." Id. "The order stated that an inspection of the apartment revealed
levels of lead in violation of New York City Health Code § 173.13(c) and (d) and
detailed the areas where the violations occurred." Allison, 172 Misc.2d at 482, 660
N.Y.S.2d at 339. "The order directed the [landlord] to correct the lead paint viola-
tions within five days." Id.
9. See Allison, 172 Misc.2d at 481, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
10. 300 West 154th Street Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings of the City of
New York, 26 N.Y.2d 538, 543, 260 N.E.2d 534, 536, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899, 902 (1970).
11. See id. at 543, 260 N.E.2d at 536, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
12. 26 N.Y.2d 538, 260 N.E.2d 534, 311 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (1970).
13. See id. at 541, 260 N.E.2d at 535, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
14. See id. at 541-42, 260 N.E.2d at 535, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
15. See 300 West 154th Street Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings of the
City of New York, 26 N.Y.2d at 542, 260 N.E.2d at 535, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
16. 154 Misc.2d 141, 584 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992).
17. See id. at 142, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
18. See id.
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and use drugs. 19 As a result of the tenant's conduct, the other
tenants in the building were denied their right to peaceful and
quiet enjoyment.20 The court stayed final eviction pending psy-
chiatric treatment aimed at curbing the tenant from performing
and condoning such conduct solely because the tenant suffered
from severe emotional and mental deterioration. 21
Landlords have also successfully used the Doctrine of Nui-
sance to evict tenants who could not or refused to control the
behavior of others. 22 Nonetheless, whether used by the landlord
or by the tenant, the Doctrine of Nuisance is primarily con-
cerned with protecting the right to use and enjoy property. 23 To
ensure its fairness, "nuisance law requires a court to engage in
a balancing test and to weigh the particular facts in each
case."24 This case by case analysis has yielded inconsistent
results.25
The court has left open the issue of whether chronically late
rent payments by the tenant constitute a "nuisance." On May 8,
1997, the Court of Appeals of New York refused to evict the ten-
ant in Sharp v. Norwood26 because the landlord failed to offer
any evidence demonstrating that the nuisance of chronically
late rent payments "interfere[d] with the use or enjoyment of
[its] property."27 However, the Court of Appeals specifically left
undecided the issue of whether an eviction proceeding grounded
in nuisance would prevail where chronically late rent payments
are accompanied by aggravating circumstances. 28
Part II of this Note introduces the laws of landlord, tenant
and nuisance. This part delves into New York's treatment of
both when and under what circumstances a theory based in nui-
sance may be used in the landlord and tenant arena. Part II of
this Note sets forth the facts and the numerous decisions of the
19. See id.
20. See id. at 142, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 990-91.
21. See Hernandez, 154 Misc.2d at 143, 148, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
22. See infra Part II.D.
23. See Frona M. Powell, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Evolution of Common
Law in Modern Pollution Cases, 21 REAL EST. L. J. 182, 188 (Fall 1992).
24. Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
25. See id.
26. 89 N.Y.2d 1068, 681 N.E.2d 1280, 659 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1997).
27. Id. at 1069, 681 N.E.2d at 1281, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
28. See id.
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Sharp case before it reached the New York Court of Appeals.
Part III summarizes the treatment given to the lead case by
New York's highest court. Part IV analyzes the New York
Court of Appeal's curt decision in Sharp in light of the current
unworkable standard. Part V concludes that the New York
Court of Appeals erred in summarily disposing of Sharp with-
out setting forth a workable standard which would yield consis-
tent results.
II. Background
A. The Law of Landlord and Tenant Generally
A landlord is "[t]he owner of an estate in land, or a rental
property, who has leased it to another person, called the 'ten-
ant."'29 A tenant is defined as "one who holds a possessory es-
tate in land for a determinate period or at will by permission of
... the landlord ... ."3o Together, the landlord and tenant con-
tract for the use and possession of a house or land for a fixed
term, at a stipulated rent and subject to additional conditions or
obligations which may be mutually agreed upon.3' A lease is
the contract between the landlord and tenant which generally
sets forth, inter alia, an agreed upon rent,32 the duration of the
leasehold, the identity of the parties and a description of the
premises. 33
As was briefly alluded to in the preceding paragraph, a
landlord ("lessor") is entitled to insert a covenant 34 into the
lease that states a specified amount which is to be paid by the
tenant ("lessee") to the landlord as rent.35 A tenant, on the
29. BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 607 (6th ed. 1991).
30. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 249 (2d ed. 1993).
31. See W. A. HOLDSWORTH, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 6 (49th ed.
1934).
32. "Leases, particularly written ones, customarily contain a number of con-
tractual covenants, virtually always including a tenant's covenant to pay rent.
None of these covenants are necessary to the existence of the leasehold .... How-
ever, because landlords generally expect rent, it is likely that a court would find an
implied promise for rent unless the parties had overcome the implication." CUN-
NINGHAM, supra note 30, at 250.
33. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 31, at 6. See also CUNNINGHAM, supra note
30, at 262.
34. "A 'covenant' is simply a promise or agreement .. " HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 31, at 10.
35. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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other hand, has the right to possession 36 for the period of time
generally specified in the lease.37 Coupled with the tenant's
right to possession, "[tihe principal covenant on the part of the
landlord, is the covenant for.., quiet enjoyment."38 Other cove-
nants which may be inserted in the lease on the part of the les-
sor include a covenant that the landlord will repair the
premises, and a covenant that the landlord will renew the lease
to the lessee upon its expiration. 39
Likewise, covenants on the part of the lessee can be in-
serted into the lease.40 One typical covenant which binds the
lessee is a covenant that the lessee will use the premises for a
specific and agreed upon purpose (e.g., use of premises limited
to the operation of a delicatessen).41 Because "[tihe payment of
rent is not essential to the existence of a leasehold,"42 a cove-
nant to pay rent is frequently inserted in a lease. 43 Nonethe-
less, "the payment of rent is obligatory upon the lessee, so long
as he continues to hold the premises without obstruction on the
part of the lessor .... 44
Covenants, of course, can be breached. 45 For example, "[iun
an actual eviction the landlord physically forces the tenant off
the premises or enters and wrongfully excludes the tenant."46
In this situation, if it is decided that the landlord's acts are
wrong, the covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached and the ten-
ant may sue the landlord for re-possession and for damages
where appropriate. Further, the tenant may sue to possibly ter-
36. The tenant must enter upon the premises for the right to possess to be
complete. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 31, at 6.
37. See CUNNINGHA I, supra note 30, at 260.
38. ROBERT BUCKLEY COMYN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT 158 (1821). The covenant of quiet enjoyment provides a warranty from the
landlord to the tenant that the latter will not be disturbed in possession by any
other individual claiming possession via a paramount right. See CUNNINGHAM,
supra note 30, at 283.
39. See CoMYN, supra note 38, at 169-70.
40. See id. at 171.
41. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 277.
42. Id. at 365.
43. See CoMYN, supra note 38, at 192.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 475.
46. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 284 (citing Barash v. Pennsylvania Termi-
nal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970); Olin
v. Goehler, 39 Wash. App. 688, 694 P.2d 1129 (1985)).
1999] 553
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minate the leasehold or to suspend rent payment. 47 In short, a
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment by actual eviction
may result in complete excuse of the tenant's performance
under the lease. 48
A constructive eviction, by comparison, results when "some
wrongful act or omission by the landlord [results in] the prem-
ises becom[ing] uninhabitable ('untenantable') for the intended
purpose."49 Phyfe v. Dale50 is illustrative. In Phyfe, due to lewd
conversations and loud arguments occurring in nearby apart-
ments, the tenant and his family were kept awake until all
hours of the night.51 Additionally, acts of prostitution occurring
in those neighboring apartments could be seen by the tenant
and his family from their apartment.5 2 On one occasion, the
tenant's wife was accosted and insulted by intoxicated men
while she was in one of the elevators.5 3 During the trial it was
shown that the landlord knew of this objectionable conduct, but
took no action to remedy matters.5 4 As a result, the tenant re-
moved himself and his family from the premises.55 When the
landlord sued the tenant for rent, the tenant counter-claimed
that he and his family were constructively evicted.56 The Appel-
late Term of the New York Supreme Court held that "[t]he ac-
tions which the landlord permitted to take place in the elevators
and halls constituted a common nuisance, which the landlord
had the complete power to abate. His failure to do so justified
the [tenant] in vacating the premises."57
As Phyfe illustrated, courts may hold landlords accountable
where a nuisance was created by the landlord's other tenants.58
47. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 284. Where the landlord only par-
tially evicts the tenant from a portion of the demised premises, the tenant may
withhold the entire amount of the rent due. See id at 286.
48. See id. at 284-85.
49. Id. at 286.
50. 72 Misc. 383, 130 N.Y.S. 231 (N.Y. App. Term. 1911).
51. See id. at 384, 130 N.Y.S. at 232.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Phyfe, 72 Misc. at 384, 130 N.Y.S. at 232.
56. See id. at 233.
57. Id. at 232.
58. See id. (citing Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376 (1909) (brothel);
Barton v. Mitchell Co., 507 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1987) (adjacent tenant, exercise
studio); Bocchini v. Gorn Management Co., 69 Md. App. 1, 515 A.2d 1179 (1986)
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Landlords may also be held accountable for "failure to provide
promised utilities, such as heat."59 In addition to the situation
where the landlord permitted a nuisance inside the leased
premises, a constructive eviction can also result where the land-
lord's wrongful act or failure to act occurs outside of the leased
premises.60 Recently however, New York courts have drawn the
line and limited a landlord's liability for nuisances created by
other tenants. 61 In any event, where constructive eviction re-
sults because the landlord breaches the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, the tenant must vacate the premises within a reasonable
time in order to assert a claim for damages or to use it as a
defense for failing to pay rent.62
"The relation of landlord and tenant may be determined by
the death of the tenant for life or cestui que vie; by the happen-
ing of the event upon which the lease is limited; by effluxion of
time; by notice to quit; by forfeiture; by merger; or by surren-
der."63 Both the fixed-term tenancy and the tenancy for years,
for example, terminate automatically at the previously agreed
upon end of the term.6 In this situation, neither the landlord
nor the tenant need give notice for the tenancy to end.65 In the
event that the tenancy is for some specified period, such as a
month, the tenancy terminates on the last day of that month.66
A tenant who does not quit the leased premises at the end of the
(noisy tenants in apartment above); Q C Corp. v. Maryland Port Administration,
68 Md. App. 181, 510 A.2d 1101 (1986) (adjacent tenant had chrome waste
landfill)).
59. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 286-87 (citing Automobile Supply Co. v.
Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930) (heat; dictum); Charles E.
Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959) (electricity,
heat, elevator); Shindler v. Grove Hall Kosher Delicatessen & Lunch, Inc., 282
Mass. 32, 184 N.E. 673 (1933) (heating system); Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal
Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970) (air
conditioning; dictum)).
60. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 286.
61. See Palais Partners v. Vollenweider, 173 Misc.2d 8, 660 N.Y.S.2d 272
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1997) (landlord not responsible for tenant's nudity and sexual acts).
62. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 288.
63. COMYN, supra note 38, at 255 (emphasis in original).
64. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 394.
65. See id. at 394-95.
66. See id. at 395.
1999] 555
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term becomes a tenant at sufferance and may be forced to ac-
cept a new lease term.67
B. The Law of Nuisance Generally
A nuisance is defined as "that activity which arises from
unreasonable, unwarranted or unlawful use by a person of his
own property, working obstruction or injury to right of another,
or to the public, and producing such material annoyance, incon-
venience and discomfort that law will presume resulting dam-
ages. '68 The most common form of nuisance is that which deals
with a condition maintained by a defendant on the defendant's
land which produces any annoyance that interferes with a
plaintiffs right to the use and enjoyment of the land possessed
by that plaintiff.69
Typically, a nuisance can be classified as public or private
or both.70 "A public nuisance is one which affects an indefinite
number of persons, or all the residents of a particular locality,
or all people coming within the extent of its range or operation,
although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal."7 A private nuisance, on the other
hand,
"includes any wrongful act which destroys or deteriorates the
property of an individual or of a few persons or interferes with
their lawful use or enjoyment thereof, or any act which unlawfully
hinders them in the enjoyment of a common or public right and
causes them a special injury different from that sustained by the
general public." 72
The basic distinction is that a public nuisance affects the public
at large, whereas a private nuisance affects only a limited
number or just one person.73 Regardless of how it is classified, a
nuisance must produce discomfort, inconvenience or annoy-
ance.7 4 A nuisance claim rooted on mere speculation or overly-
67. See id. at 271-72, 395.
68. BLACKs LAw DICTIONARY 736 (6th ed. 1991).
69. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 417.
70. See BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 736.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 420.
74. See JOSEPH A. JOYCE and HowARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAw Gov-
ERNING NUISANCES 32 (1906).
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nervous sensitivities is likely to fail. 75 In short, a nuisance
must "substantially interfere[] with the ordinary comfort of
human existence." 76
Although monetary damages may be sought, most plaintiffs
seek to enjoin the defendant from perpetuating the harmful
nuisance. 77 It is quite possible, however, that a court will deny
an injunction because "it would do more harm than good."78 For
example, where an injunction would result in unemployment or
other disadvantages to the surrounding community, a court
may refuse to enjoin the nuisance created by a commercial en-
terprise.79 In order to reach this determination, a court will
normally balance the effect on the plaintiff if an injunction is
not granted versus the effect on the defendant if an injunction is
granted.80 When performing this balancing, a court will con-
sider social and economic factors.8'
When dealing with the law of landlord and tenant, a claim
based on nuisance, where appropriate, may lie with either the
landlord or tenant as against the other.8 2 For example, "[a]n
action or suit may be brought by a landowner, though he is not
such owner at the time of the erection of the nuisance."8 3 Thus,
where the tenant's wrongful conduct affects the landlord's inter-
est in the property, the landlord is clearly within his or her legal
right to sue the tenant for the resulting damage.8 4 Likewise,
"tenants in possession may maintain an action or suit for injury
sustained during the tenancy."8 5 Where a nuisance affects the
tenant's comfort or health, the fact that the tenant occupies, but
75. See id.
76. Id. at 32-33. (citations omitted).
77. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 421(citations omitted).
78. Id. Of course, a court may also choose to issue a partial injunction rather
than a total prohibition. See id. at 421-22.
79. See id. at 421 (citing Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S.
334 (1933); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), on remand 72 Misc. 2d 834, 340 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972), affd, 42
A.D.2d 496, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1973).
80. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 421.
81. See id.
82. See JOYCE, supra note 74, at 636-40.
83. Id. at 636.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 638 (citations omitted).
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does not own the premises, does not prohibit the tenant from
seeking to remedy, abate or recover from the nuisance.8 6
C. Rent Control Goals and Rent and Eviction Regulations in
New York City Generally
In an attempt to protect against unconscionable rent in-
creases and to rectify a severe housing shortage, New York
State decided that it would no longer allow landlords and ten-
ants to deal without state monitoring.8 7 On January 15, 1951,
the Temporary State Housing Rent Commission ("the Commis-
sion") submitted its Rent Control Plan ("the Plan") to the Legis-
lature of the State of New York.88 To aid in drafting the Plan,
the Commission conducted a Survey of Rents and Rental Condi-
tions ("Survey").8 9 From its Survey, the Committee reached, in-
ter alia, the following conclusions:
(1) The shortage of housing accommodations is still acute in all of
the areas of the State [of New York] now subject to rent control.
(3) The Commission's Survey clearly reveals that we have not re-
covered from the impact of World War II ....
(4) Forces are in the making which will make it virtually impossi-
ble to foresee the day when the supply of housing will sufficiently
approximate the demand to permit rent control to give way to the
normal bargaining relations between landlord and tenant.
(6) While a return to normal relations between landlord and ten-
ant still remains the policy of the State [of New York] and of this
Commission, the Commission cannot recommend any measure of
decontrol [as of January 15, 19511.90
As a result, the Commission addressed the two broad objec-
tives mandated by the Legislature in 1946 when it enacted the
Rent Control Law: "(1) the continuation of [rent] controls [only]
so long as required and (2) their gradual elimination as soon as
an easing of the housing situation would permit."91 In short,
86. See id. at 639.
87. See JOSEPH D. MCGOLDRICK, RENT CONTROL PLAN AND PROPOSED RENT
AND EVICTION REGULATIONS 17 (1951).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 17-18.
91. Id. at 20.
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rent control in the state of New York was created as a protective
device. 92 The goal was to protect "the public from inflation and
tenants from gouging that would inevitably result from the
acute housing shortage that ha[d] existed in the urban areas of
[the United States] and [of New York State] since 1942."93
To further protect against "speculative, unwarranted and
abnormal increases in rents,"94 the Legislature of the State of
New York also regulates and controls evictions. 95 The legisla-
ture separated the grounds for eviction into two distinct catego-
ries.96 The first category exists where "the landlord claims that
the conduct of the tenant is such as to deprive [the landlord] of
the protection of the regulations or where the occupancy of the
tenant is illegal because of the requirements of local or state
law."97 In this first category, the landlord must serve written
notice on both the tenant and the "district rent office."98 For
notice to be valid, it is imperative that the landlord state the
following: (1) the ground upon which it relies for the tenant's
removal or eviction; (2) the material facts supporting the exist-
ence of this reliance; and (3) the date when the landlord re-
quires the tenant to surrender possession. 9 After service, the
landlord may bring an action or proceeding to recover posses-
sion against the tenant in the local court. 100 In this first cate-
gory, the landlord need not secure a certificate from the
Administrator before serving the tenant.10
The second category, on the other hand, bars the landlord
from evicting the tenant unless the landlord first secures a cer-
tificate from the Administrator. 10 2 Issuance of the certificate
permits the landlord to pursue its action or proceeding to re-
cover possession when the applicable waiting period has ex-
92. See McGOLDRICK, supra note 87, at 18.
93. Id. at 18.
94. N.Y. STATE RENT CONTROL § 8581(1) (McKinney 1987).
95. See id.
96. See McGOLDRICK, supra note 87, at 29.
97. Id.
98. N.Y. RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS § 2204.3(a) (McKinney 1987).
99. See id. § 2204.3(b).
100. See McGOLDRICK, supra note 87, at 29.
101. See id.
102. See id.
1999] 559
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pired. 0 3 "A certificate, [for example], shall be issued where the
landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of a housing
accommodation because of immediate and compelling necessity
for his own personal use and occupancy, or for the use and occu-
pancy of his immediate family .. ,"1o4 Or, the Administrator
shall issue a certificate when the landlord seeks possession of
the premises for the purpose of remodeling or substantially al-
tering it.105 In short, the landlord must demonstrate an imme-
diate and compelling necessity before an Administrator will
issue a certificate. 10 6 However, regardless of whether the rea-
son is for personal gain or for remodeling purposes, the Admin-
istrator must carefully scrutinize both the landlord's motives
and the Rent and Eviction Regulations before making a deter-
mination to evict the tenant. 07
D. Selected New York Cases Which Demonstrate a Tenant's
Eviction Where "the Tenant Committ[ed] or
Permitt[ed] a Nuisance"08
In 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department's judg-
ment evicting an 80-year-old tenant from an apartment on the
17th floor of a building bordering Manhattan's Central Park
West. 0 9 The tenant in Frank v. Park Summit Realty Corp."0
periodically allowed his 37-year-old nephew to reside with
him."' The nephew, who suffered from chronic schizophrenia,
would often engage in bizarre and disturbing behavior while re-
siding in the tenant's apartment." 2 For example, the nephew
would appear in the nude in the building's public places, would
103. See id. Where the tenant is required to relocate, the applicable waiting
period is four months. Conversely, where the tenant need not relocate, the appli-
cable waiting period is three months. See N.Y. RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS
§§ 2204.4(a)-(b)(1) (McKinney 1987).
104. Id. § 2204.5(a).
105. See id. § 2204.7(a).
106. See McGOLDRICK, supra note 87, at 29.
107. See id.
108. N.Y. RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS § 2204.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1987).
109. See Frank v. Park Summit Realty Corp., 175 A.D.2d 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d
655 (1st Dep't 1991).
110. 175 A.D.2d 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1st Dep't 1991).
111. See id.
112. See id.
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verbally abuse the other residents including threats of physical
and sexual assault, and caused a health and safety hazard to
the other residents because of his inattention to personal hy-
giene and unsanitary manners." 3 On one occasion, the nephew
even punched his uncle, the tenant, in the face. 114 While it is
true that the nephew could control this conduct by taking pre-
scribed medication, he often failed to do so.115 As a result, the
police had to be summoned on numerous occasions to usher the
nephew to a nearby hospital for induced administration of the
prescribed medicine. 16 Shortly thereafter, the nephew under-
went voluntary treatment on an outpatient basis to regain his
normal behavior. 117
In 1989, the landlord counterclaimed in the tenant's suit
seeking an abatement"" in his rent arguing for the tenant's
eviction on the theory that the latter condoned a nuisance cre-
ated by the tenant's schizophrenic nephew.11 9 The New York
Supreme Court concluded that "[the landlord] had 'not yet
proven a nuisance' sufficient to justify [the tenant's] eviction." 20
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the trial, the New York
Supreme Court "issued a stern warning to [the tenant] that
henceforth he would be held responsible for his nephew's pub-
licly antisocial behavior and creation of unsanitary conditions,
and [the tenant] would also be responsible for monitoring the
nephew's medication schedule and attendance at the clinic for
medical treatment."' 2' Additionally, the New York Supreme
Court additionally warned the tenant that if he failed to curb
his nephew from further incidents, a renewal of the eviction
proceeding would be immediately entertained.122
113. See id. at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56.
114. See id. at 35, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
115. See Frank, 175 A.D.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
116. See id. at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 655. The tenant had a history of withhold-
ing the rent in his attempt to have the landlord provide services which included
repairs. See id. at 37, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (Milonas, J., dissenting). The New York
Supreme Court, however, denied the tenant's claim for rent abatement. See
Frank, 175 A.D.2d at 33, 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 655, 656.
119. See id. at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
120. Id. at 33, 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
121. Id. at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
122. See id.
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Four months later, however, the tenant's nephew reverted
back to his antisocial behavior which was proscribed by the
Supreme Court.123 Once again, the nephew was shouting ob-
scenities in public places within the building. 124 Moreover, the
nephew was now physically molesting both the females em-
ployed to work in the building as well as the female residents. 125
As a result, the landlord took up the Supreme Court's invitation
and renewed its eviction proceeding. 126 The tenant involunta-
rily committed his nephew and promised that the nephew
would not be permitted to return to his residence. 27 Because
the nephew's commitment was only temporary, the Supreme
Court disposed of this proceeding a second time by enjoining the
tenant from "'directly or indirectly allowing [the nephew] to re-
turn to residence"' at the tenant's apartment.128 The Supreme
Court did not, however, enjoin the nephew from visiting either
the building or the tenant's apartment.129 Thus, the landlord
appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department. 130
The Appellate Division stated that "[a] nuisance is a condi-
tion that threatens the comfort and safety of others in the build-
ing. If the key to the definition is a pattern of continuity or
recurrence of objectionable conduct, [the landlord] has long sat-
isfied this test."131 By allowing his nephew to reside in his
apartment, the tenant "permitt[ed] a nuisance"132 and thereby
usurped "[tihe safety and domestic tranquillity of [both] other
tenants in the building" and those individuals employed to work
in the building. 133 As a result, the Appellate Division concluded
that the tenant's eviction was warranted. 34 This conclusion
was affirmed five months later by the Court of Appeals of New
123. See id. at 35, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
124. See Frank, 175 A.D.2d at 35, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 35, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
129. See Frank, 175 A.D.2d at 35, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
130. See id. at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
131. Id. at 35-36, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (citations omitted).
132. N.Y. RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS § 2204.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1987).
133. Frank, 175 A.D.2d at 36, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
134. See id.
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York. 135 Although the Court of Appeals modified Frank on a dif-
ferent ground, it affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that
the tenant's conduct constituted a nuisance and thereby war-
ranted the tenant's eviction. 136
Following the Court of Appeals decision in Frank, the
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department evicted a
tenant who suffered from schizophrenia despite the tenant's ar-
gument that her conduct did not constitute a nuisance because
it was precipitated by her mental illness and was thus uninten-
tional.137 In Eskin, five neighbors testified that the tenant's
abusive and antisocial behavior substantially interfered with
their comfort and safety. 38 Specifically, those who testified
stated that they were threatened by the tenant and that they
often witnessed the tenant cause disturbances in the building's
public areas. 39 Although the tenant did not testify, her psychi-
atrist stated that in his opinion, the tenant was not violent.' 40
The psychiatrist also testified, however, that he expected the
tenant's past outbursts to repeat themselves at some future
point.'4 ' As a result, the Appellate Term concluded that the
tenant's state of mind is not at issue where the holdover pro-
ceeding is grounded in nuisance, but rather the effect that the
tenant's conduct has upon the building staff and the building's
other tenants is dispositive. 14 2
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
First Department, citing Frank, affirmed the eviction of a ten-
ant for her failure to stop her unemancipated teenage children
from, inter alia, urinating in public hallways. 14 3 The Torres
135. See Frank v. Park Summit Realty Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 789, 587 N.E.2d 287,
579 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1991).
136. See id. The Court of Appeals reinstated a portion of the Supreme Court's
order which awarded the tenant a partial rent abatement. The Appellate Division
erred when it awarded the landlord all rent arrears. See id. at 792, 587 N.E.2d at
287-88, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 649-50.
137. See 301 East 69th St. Assoc. v. Eskin, 156 Misc. 2d 122, 600 N.Y.S.2d 887
(N.Y. App. Term 1993).
138. See id. at 123, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Eskin, 156 Misc.2d at 123, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
143. See Acorn Realty, L.L.C. v. Torres, 169 Misc. 2d 670, 652 N.Y.S.2d 472
(N.Y. App. Term. 1st Dep't 1996).
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court held that the tenant's failure to curtail her children's anti-
social behavior constituted a nuisance and warranted her evic-
tion. 44 In addition to urinating in the building's public
hallways, the tenant's children repeatedly vandalized both the
door to the building's front entrance and its elevator, used mari-
juana in the building's public hallways, verbally abused other
residents, and assaulted the building's staff.145 Citing Frank,
the Appellate Term stated that this
pattern of objectionable behavior substantially threatens the com-
fort and safety of others in the building, and "demand[s] the pro-
tection of the law in the form of the eviction of [the tenant], whose
conduct permitted and condoned the nuisance and whose tenancy
itself, in all likelihood, will encourage the nuisance to continue
unabated."146
E. New York's Movement Toward Concluding That "the
Tenant Is Committing or Permitting a Nuisance"147 by
Chronically Tendering the Rent After It Is Due
In 25th Realty Associates v. Griggs,48 the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Department, set forth guidelines to de-
termine whether a tenant's untimely rent payments constitute
a nuisance. 49 In Griggs, the landlord commenced suit in the
Supreme Court of New York County to recover possession of the
apartment. 150 The landlord sought a declaration proclaiming
that the tenant's continued occupancy created a nuisance.' 5' In
response, the tenant defended by stating that he was withhold-
ing the rent because the premises were in need of repair, and a
bona fide dispute with the landlord existed over whether he was
entitled to a rent reduction. 52 The Supreme Court granted the
tenant's cross motion for summary judgment, but the Appellate
144. See id. at 671, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
145. See id.
146. Id. (citing Frank v. Park Summit Realty Corp., 175 A.D.2d 33, 36, 573
N.Y.S.2d 655, 658, modified on other grounds, 79 N.Y.2d 789, 587 N.E.2d 287, 579
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1991)).
147. N.Y. RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS § 2204.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1987).
148. 150 A.D.2d 155, 540 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1st Dep't 1989).
149. See id. at 156, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
150. See id. at 155, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 156, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
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Division reversed and remanded to the trial court because it felt
that the tenant's motives for withholding the rent could not be
adequately squared from the record alone.153
As in Sharp, the premises the landlord sought to recover in
Griggs were occupied for more than thirty years by a rent-con-
trolled tenant. 54 Moreover, the tenant in Griggs, like the ten-
ant in Sharp, consistently failed to pay his rent on time and, as
a result, forced the landlord to bring repeated nonpayment ac-
tions against him. 55 Specifically, during a six-year period, the
landlord in Griggs brought eleven successful nonpayment ac-
tions against the tenant. 5 6 The Appellate Division remanded
the case back to the Supreme Court to determine whether the
tenant was truly justified in not paying his rent or whether the
tenant was merely harassing the landlord. 57 To aid the trial
court, the Appellate Division stated that in order "to evict a ten-
ant for chronic late payment of rent, the landlord must show
that it was compelled to bring numerous nonpayment proceed-
ings within a relatively short period and that the tenant's non-
payment was willful, unjustified, without explanation, or
accompanied by an intent to harass the landlord." 58
Although the Appellate Division stated in Griggs that the
landlord must offer proof that it brought numerous nonpayment
proceedings against the tenant, 5 9 that court did not, however,
specify how many proceedings the landlord was obliged to bring
against a tenant to satisfy this requirement. In Greene v.
Stone, 60 the Appellate Division partially answered this query
by stating that "the number of nonpayment actions commenced
153. See Griggs, 150 A.D.2d at 156-57, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36.-
154. See id. at 156, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 157, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 436. After trial, the Appellate Division
modified the Supreme Court's order in that, inter alia, unless the tenant received
written authorization from the landlord, the tenant could not resume occupancy or
residency whether it be temporary or otherwise. See 25th Realty Associates v.
Griggs, 195 A.D.2d 428, 428-29, 602 N.Y.S.2d 526, 526 (1993). On September 14,
1993, the Court of Appeals of New York denied the tenant's motion for leave to
appeal. See 25th Realty Associates v. Griggs, 82 N.Y.2d 747, 622 N.E.2d 301, 602
N.Y.S.2d 800 (1993).
158. Griggs, 150 A.D.2d at 156, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (citations omitted).
159. See id.
160. 160 A.D.2d 367, 553 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1st Dep't 1990).
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is relevant only in the context of the entire circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged withholding of rent."161 In short, no
"magic number" exists.162
In Greene, the landlord brought a holdover proceeding
against his rent-stabilized tenant because the tenant failed to
timely pay his rent on forty-nine separate occasions. 63 More-
over, the tenant often carried a balance into the following
month. 64 On one specific occasion, for example, the rent went
unpaid for a period of thirteen consecutive months. 65 In addi-
tion, on nine separate occasions the tenant's rent checks were
subsequently returned for insufficient funds. 66 As a result,
during this four year period, the landlord was forced to serve
the tenant with legal process twenty-one times, three of which
were nonpayment proceedings. 167
Despite the fact that the landlord in Greene was forced to
bring numerous nonpayment actions, the Civil Court of New
York County dismissed this summary holdover proceeding be-
cause it found insufficient proof to conclude that the tenant sub-
stantially violated his lease agreement. 168 The Appellate Term,
First Department, affirmed the dismissal. 69 The Appellate Di-
vision, First Department, however, reversed and remanded for
a determination of whether the tenant was justified in with-
holding rent. 170 The Appellate Division stated that the tenant's
"possession of the subject premises may constitute a nuisance
warranting eviction if not adequately explained by the
tenant."'
7
'
In order to find a nuisance in a holdover proceeding, the
trial court must find that the landlord was forced to bring re-
peated nonpayment proceedings against the tenant. 72 The trial
court must additionally probe the tenant's motive for paying the
161. Id. at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
162. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d 6, 9, 643 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1st Dep't 1996).
163. See Greene, 160 A.D.2d at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
164. See id. at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
165. See id. at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
166. See id. at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
167. See id. at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
168. See Greene, 160 A.D.2d at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
169. See id. at 367, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
170. See id. at 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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rent late. 173 In probing the tenant's motive, the Greene court
was required to determine whether the tenant purposefully in-
tended to harass the landlord or whether the tenant lacked an
explanation to justify withholding the rent payment that was
due. 174 In Ocean Farragut Associates v. Sawyer,175 the Civil
Court of the City of New York rendered a final judgment of pos-
session in the landlord's favor.176 In Sawyer, the landlord was
forced to bring nine proceedings for nonpayment of the rent
against the tenant over a period of forty-two months. 177 The
tenant never disputed the suits and paid the amount claimed by
the landlord plus the landlord's costs. 178 However, during an
even shorter period of only twenty-four months, eleven of the
tenant's rent checks failed to clear due to insufficient funds. 179
In Sawyer, the landlord demonstrated that (1) it was forced to
bring numerous nonpayment proceedings against the tenant,
(2) the tenant was unjustified in withholding any portion of the
rent due, and (3) the tenant's willful payment with "bad" checks
was intended to harass the landlord. 180 This combination of fac-
tors led the Sawyer court to hold that the tenant's eviction for
late payment of rent was warranted.
F. Treatment of the Lead Case, Sharp v. Norwood, Before It
Reached the Appellate Division, First Department
Under New York's Rent and Eviction Regulations, a land-
lord may maintain an action or a proceeding to recover posses-
sion of its leased property without first obtaining a certificate
from an Administrator. 8 1 Specifically, a landlord may main-
tain an action where "[t]he tenant is committing or permitting a
nuisance in such housing accommodations."18 2 In March 1992,
using these regulations as a guideline, Sharp ("landlord") com-
menced a holdover proceeding against Norwood ("tenant")
173. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
175. 119 Misc.2d 712, 464 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
176. See id. at 716, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
177. See id. at 712, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
178. See id. at 712-13, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
179. See id. at 713, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
180. See Sawyer, 119 Misc.2d at 715, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 347-48.
181. See N.Y. RENT & EvICTION REGULATIONS § 2204.2 (McKinney 1987).
182. Id. § 2204.2(a)(2).
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claiming that Norwood's chronically late rent payments consti-
tuted a "nuisance."'18 3
On or about November 1, 1961, Norwood and her former
husband commenced occupancy of an apartment located in
Manhattan. 84 The apartment building was subsequently con-
verted to cooperative ownership but Norwood did not purchase
the proprietary shares allocated to her unit. 8 5 Rather, Nor-
wood retained her tenant status under the written lease agree-
ment; a status which continued to be subject to City Rent Law
and the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations. 186
In 1992, the landlord served Norwood with a "Notice of Ter-
mination" claiming, inter alia, that Norwood tendered her rent
payments in an untimely fashion. 8 7 Specifically, during the pe-
riod of November 1990 through March 1992, the landlord
served 11 three-day rent demands on Norwood. 88 Shortly after
the landlord served the "Notice of Termination," it commenced
this holdover proceeding. 8 9 Judge Fisher-Brandveen, then sit-
ting on the Civil Court, 90 granted Norwood's motion to dismiss
183. See Sharp v. Norwood, 223 A.D.2d 6, 643 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1996).
The Appellate Division, First Department, noted that the landlord in this matter
did not predicate its holdover proceeding upon the breach of a leasehold obligation
theory. See id. In noting this, the Appellate Division, First Department, expressly
stated that the landlord may have chosen the nuisance theory in an attempt to
avoid the remedial prescription of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
§ 753(4) which grants the tenant a ten-day stay to cure the breach. See id. at 11,
643 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Under a nuisance theory, however, the tenant does not have
an opportunity to cure where chronically late rent payments are found to consti-
tute a nuisance. See id. at 11, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (citing 301 East 22nd Street Co.
v. Lampert, NY.J, July 2, 1984, at 13, col. 5 (App. Term, 1st Dep't)).
184. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 7, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
185. See id.
186. See id. Peter J. Sharp, now deceased, was the holder of the unsold shares
allocated to Norwood's cooperative unit. See id. Peter Hagner Sharp, Caroline
Mary Sharp and Randall Allison Sharp, as executors of the will of Peter J. Sharp,
were the successors-in-interest and had taken Peter J. Sharp's place in this pro-
ceeding. See id. at 6, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 39. Peter J. Sharp, the original petitioner,
died during the pendency of the proceeding. See id. at 14, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44 n.1
(Sullivan, J., dissenting).
187. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 7, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
188. See id. at 14, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 7, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
190. Judge Fisher-Brandveen is currently the Chief Administrative Judge of
the Civil Court of the City of New York. The New York City Civil Court (NYCCC)
is one of the largest courts in the world. As the name implies, this court functions
only in New York City. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 20 (2d ed.
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this holdover proceeding. 191 Judge Fisher-Brandveen's decision
rested upon the finding that: (1) during the thirty-three years
that Norwood resided in this same apartment, the landlord
commenced only two 192 nonpayment proceedings in the prior fif-
teen years that Norwood had lived in the apartment; and (2) the
"Notice of Termination" failed to indicate any arrearages owed
by Norwood.' 93  The landlord appealed Judge Fisher-
Brandveen's grant of Norwood's dismissal motion to the Appel-
late Term, First Department. 194
The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Depart-
ment, held that "[clhronic late payment and nonpayment of rent
may constitute a nuisance warranting eviction if not adequately
explained by the tenant" and it unanimously reversed the order
and reinstated the landlord's petition. 95 The Appellate Term
found that the facts set forth in the petition and in the "Notice
of Termination" were sufficient to support the landlord's cause
of action for nuisance.196 Thus, the Appellate Term reversed the
dismissal of the complaint and sent it back to the trial court. 197
During the trial, Norwood explained that her difficulty in
paying the rent on time stemmed from the late alimony pay-
ments she received from her ex-husband. 198 "Clearly, a woman
1991). NYCCC has monetary jurisdiction up to $25,000. See id. In addition,
NYCCC only has civil jurisdiction; this includes real property actions. See id. In
the area of summary proceedings, NYCCC has jurisdiction to render a judgment of
dispossession, for rent and of interpleader claims. See id. A judgment for rent,
however, may be rendered without monetary limitation. See id. Litigants urging
counterclaims need not be concerned with a monetary limit when dealing with this
court because the limit is not applicable to counterclaims. See SIEGEL, at 20.
NYCCC also has equity jurisdiction, but this jurisdiction is statutorily limited to
actions dealing with real property and contract rescission or reform. See id. In
1972, an amendment to the New York City Civil Court Act (NYCCCA) expanded
equity jurisdiction in housing cases in an attempt to meet problems in residential
housing. See id.
191. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 7, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
192. See id. at 10, 11, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The landlord contended that six
nonpayment proceedings were commenced against Norwood during the course of a
nine-year period. The First Department agreed with Judge Fisher-Brandveen's
finding, however, that only two such proceedings were commenced. See id.
193. See id. at 7, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
194. See id.
195. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 7, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
198. See id. Norwood and her husband were divorced in 1970 and for a
number of years thereafter, Norwood's ex-husband's attorney paid the landlord di-
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
who is entitled to moneys from her ex-husband by court order
and fails to receive same in a timely fashion cannot be consid-
ered to have engaged in willful conduct as to warrant a nui-
sance when her rent is tendered late."199 Thus, finding no
evidence that Norwood's conduct was willful, harmful or unjus-
tified, or that it rose to the level of a nuisance, Judge Arthur
Scott dismissed the proceeding. 200
The Appellate Term, in a split decision, 20 1 affirmed. 20 2 Like
Judge Scott, the majority of the Appellate Term held that Nor-
wood's conduct was not intended to harass the landlord and it
did not rise to the level of a nuisance. 20 3 On a purely procedural
basis, the dissent pointed out that "financial inability to pay is
not a defense to chronic late payments and, even if it were, such
a defense was not proved."204 Thereafter, the landlord's motion
to appeal this decision and order to the Appellate Division was
granted by the Appellate Term. 20 5
G. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department's Decision in Sharp
To prevail on a nuisance theory, a landlord must satisfy
two elements: first, the landlord must show that it was "com-
pelled to bring numerous nonpayment proceedings within a rel-
atively short period and that the tenant's nonpayment was
willful, unjustified, without explanation, or accompanied by an
intent to harass the landlord;"20 6 second, the landlord must
show that it brought those numerous nonpayment proceedings
"in good faith to collect outstanding rent and not as a pretense
rectly. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40. In 1988, however, the
attorney ceased this practice and Norwood began to receive a correspondingly
larger alimony check. See id. It was from this alimony check that Norwood
claimed she paid the rent. See id. Moreover, during the trial of this action, Nor-
wood explained that her ex-husband's alimony checks were often not cashable due
to insufficient funds. See id. at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
199. Id. at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40-41.
200. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
201. Justices Stanley Parness and Edith Miller in the majority and Justice
William P. McCooe dissenting.
202. See id. at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 16, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 8, 13, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41, 44.
206. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41, 44 (citing 25th Realty Associ-
ates v. Griggs, 150 A.D.2d 155, 156, 540 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (1st Dep't 1989)).
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to meet the definition of nuisance for the purposes of bringing a
holdover action."20 7 Compared with an action predicated on a
breach of a leasehold obligation, therefore, the landlord in this
matter must prove more than a mere pattern of Norwood's late
rent payments.208
Here, the landlord brought only two such nonpayment pro-
ceedings against Norwood within the prior fifteen years; neither
of those actions were ever litigated. 20 9 Holding that the prior
nonpayment proceedings were "a woeful [and] transparent ef-
fort to bring this action within established case law regarding
the number of and immediacy of prior nonpayment proceedings
needed for the purpose of bringing a holdover action based on
nuisance," the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed
the dismissal of this holdover proceeding. 210 In short, the Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, refused to allow the land-
lord to predicate a nuisance holdover proceeding on two prior
nonpayment proceedings.211
The Appellate Division, First Department, emphatically
stated that there is clearly no "magic number" of prior nonpay-
ment proceedings required to prove nuisance as a basis for evic-
tion.21 2 Rather, "the number of nonpayment actions commenced
is relevant only in the context of the entire circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged withholding of rent .... ,,21 3 In this matter,
the Appellate Division, First Department, pointed out that Nor-
207. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
208. See id. at 11, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.
209. See id. at 8-9, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The landlord commenced the first non-
payment proceeding action shortly after December 1, 1991, to collect December's
rent. See id. This action was discontinued, however, because Norwood paid De-
cember's rent before she was served with the petition. See id. The landlord com-
menced the second nonpayment proceeding action in February 1992, but because
the wrong party was served and because Norwood paid February's rent before she
was served with the petition, the action was never litigated. See Sharp, 223
A.D.2d at 8-9, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
210. Id. at 9, 12, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41, 43.
211. See id. at 9, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
212. Id. See 25th Realty Associates v. Griggs, 150 A.D.2d 155, 540 N.Y.S.2d
434 (1st Dep't 1989), where, in a six year period, the landlord prevailed in eleven
nonpayment proceedings against the tenant. Despite this finding, the First De-
partment remanded for a determination whether the tenant had bona fide reason
to withhold the rent due to building code violations and disputes over rent reduc-
tion. See id.
213. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 9, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (citing Greene v. Stone, 160
A.D.2d 367, 368, 553 N.Y.S.2d 421 at 422 (1st Dep't 1990)).
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wood never refused to pay the rent.214 Moreover, during the
trial Norwood explained that the reason she paid the rent late
was because the money came from her alimony payment and
her ex-husband's payments were often late.215 Lastly, this court
pointed out that Norwood never carried a balance into the fol-
lowing month.216 Thus, "[iun viewing the totality of the circum-
stances presented, [the First Department] conclude[d] that the
evidence at trial did not establish that [Norwood's] late pay-
ment of rent constituted a nuisance."217 In short, the Appellate
Division, First Department, stated that Norwood's conduct was
neither willful, unjustified or lacking in explanation, nor was it
an attempt to harass the landlord. 218
Turning next to the doctrine of equity,219 the Appellate Di-
vision, First Department, then discussed numerous cases hold-
ing that courts dislike lease forfeiture. 220 This, stated the First
Department, was a well-settled equitable principle. 221 Recalling
that the elderly Norwood had occupied this same apartment for
over thirty-three years, the court stated that "it would be ineq-
uitable to permit the landlord to forfeit [Norwood's] rent-con-
trolled tenancy and direct [her] eviction." 222 The court added
that Norwood's lease forfeiture would be especially inequitable
due to the scarcity of affordable housing accommodations in
New York City.223
214. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 9, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
215. See id. at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
216. See id. at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
217. Id.
218. See id. (relying on 25th Realty Associates v. Griggs, 150 A.D.2d 155, 540
N.Y.S.2d 434 (1st Dep't 1989)).
219. "Justice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the
strictly formulated rules of common law. It is based on a system of rules and prin-
ciples which originated in England as an alternative to the harsh rules of common
law and which were based on what was fair in a particular situation." BLAcK's
LAw DICTIoNARY 540 (6' ed. 1991).
220. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 11, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (citing Harar Realty
Corp. v. Michlin & Hill, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 182, 188, 449 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218, appeal
dismissed 57 N.Y.2d 836, 442 N.E.2d 60, 455 N.Y.S.2d 763; 57 N.Y.2d 607, 442
N.E.2d 69, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1989); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty
Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 354, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1991); 220 West 42 Assoc. v.
Cohen, 60 Misc. 2d 983, 302 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1987)).
221. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 11, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
222. Id.
223. See id.
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Finally, the First Department focused on the illegal and in-
sufficient documentation supporting the landlord's case.224 Spe-
cifically, the court pointed out that "the landlord placed no
evidence before [it] to establish with certainty when [Norwood]
paid the rent within any given month."225 At the trial, Norwood
stated that because her ex-husband's alimony checks occasion-
ally bounced due to insufficient funds, she developed the habit
of buying a money order upon successful cashing of the alimony
check, dating it the first of the month regardless of the actual
date, and paying the rent in person at the landlord's manage-
ment office.226 All of these activities were completed by Nor-
wood on the same day.227 Further testimony revealed that the
landlord would same-day deposit the funds if Norwood paid
early enough; otherwise, he would deposit the funds the next
day.228 Because Norwood had a habit of incorrectly dating the
money orders and the landlord never issued receipts for these
money orders, the court stated that "no one can say for certain
how late the rent was [paid] ."229
H. The Dissent in the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
First Department
"The [landlord's] petition to terminate the tenancy should
be granted on the ground that [Norwood's] continuous late pay-
ment of rent constitutes a nuisance."230 Presiding Judge Sulli-
van stated that while it is true that the law disfavors lease
forfeiture, 23' it similarly does not permit the courts to turn a
blind eye on a landlord's legal rights when dealing with a ten-
224. See id. at 12, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 43. As a specific example, the court pointed
out that the landlord, in violation of Real Property Law § 235-e, admitted that it
never issued rent receipts for Norwood's money order rent payments. See id. The
First Department also stated, however, that the documentation supporting Nor-
wood's defense was likewise poor. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 12, 643 N.Y.S.2d at
43.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 12, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
229. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 12, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
230. See id. at 13, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (relying on Tehan v. Thos. C. Peters Printing Co., 71 A.D.2d 101, 106,
421 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (1968)).
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ant who virtually never pays her rent on time. 232 In this mat-
ter, the landlord was forced to repeatedly serve monthly rent
demands.233 Moreover, the landlord repeatedly was forced to
commence nonpayment proceedings. 234 In short, Judge Sulli-
van stated that the law permits the courts to relieve a tenant of
her lease obligations when that tenant, month after month, over
a period of nine years, repeatedly paid her rent late.235 Judge
Sullivan concluded that clearly such default constituted a
nuisance. 236
In a holdover proceeding, as previously stated, a landlord
must demonstrate that it was forced to bring repeated nonpay-
ment proceedings to prevail on a nuisance theory.237 According
to Judge Sullivan, the landlord met and surpassed this obliga-
tion.238 Not only did the landlord remind Norwood of her writ-
ten lease obligations after her succession to her former
husband's lease rights,239 the landlord served voluminous rent
demands in his efforts to get Norwood to pay her rent in a
timely fashion.240 Judge Sullivan pointed out that, to no avail,
Norwood remained indifferent to her obligation under the writ-
ten lease to pay her rent on time and was on average 16.94 days
late with her rent payments. 241 As a result of numerous at-
232. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 13, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
238. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 14, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
239. In November 1990, the landlord's attorney wrote Norwood the following
letter to remind her of her obligation to pay her rent on time under the written
lease: "In examining your recent rental history, [the landlord] finds that you are
consistently paying rent in a manner other than [what] is called for in your lease.
It is not acceptable for rent to be paid in the middle of the month or at the end of
the month. Rather, rent is to be paid at the beginning of each month." Id.
240. The landlord served Norwood eleven three-day rent demands for the sev-
enteen month period from October 1990 to February 1992. Moreover, the landlord
served Norwood 44 rent demands for the nine-year period from April 1983 to April
1992. See id.
241. For the nine-year period from April 1983 to April 1992, Norwood, on av-
erage, was 16.94 days late paying her rent. See id. at 14, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44-45.
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tempts to extract the rent from Norwood, the landlord incurred
legal expenses. 242
Judge Sullivan's dissenting opinion pointed out numerous
areas where, in his opinion, the majority fell short of "viewing
the totality of the circumstances presented"243 to arrive at the
conclusion that the landlord failed to establish that Norwood's
chronically late rent payments constituted a nuisance.24 For
example, pointing to statistics from a computer-generated
spreadsheet of Norwood's rent payment history which was in
evidence at the trial, Sullivan identified numerous times when
Norwood failed to pay her rent for months at a time.245 When
the majority stated that Norwood never carried a balance into a
future month, it looked only to the period surrounding the land-
lord's filing of the Notice of Termination. 246 Moreover, Judge
Sullivan noted that at trial, Norwood did not offer documentary
proof to support her claim that only her alimony checks were
earmarked solely for the payment of rent.247 In fact, it was
shown at trial that Norwood was gainfully employed, but the
Civil Court claimed that this evidence was irrelevant and did
not permit additional inquiry into Norwood's salary or the na-
ture of her position.248
In addition to the majority's incomplete assessment of the
"totality of the circumstances presented,"249 Judge Sullivan's
dissenting opinion pointed out wholly inaccurate tests employed
by the majority. 250 For example, Judge Sullivan stated that the
majority's reliance on the fact that Norwood never refused to
242. See id. at 15, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
243. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
244. See id. at 13, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
245. [Norwood] paid the May 1984 rent on July 9, 1984, 69 days late; she paid
the June 1984 rent on August 8, 1984, 68 days late; her July 1984 rent on August
22, 1984, 52 days late; her May 1983 rent on June 6, 1983, 36 days late; her June
1985 rent on July 16, 1985, 45 days late; her January and February 1988 rent 31
and 39 days late, respectively; her April 1989 rent on May 1, 1989, 30 days late;
her July 1989 rent on August 2, 1989, 32 days late; her April and July 1990 rent 22
days late; her October 1991 rent 20 days late; and her February 1991 rent 18 days
late. See id. at 15, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
246. See id. at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
247. See id. at 16, 643 N.Y.S.2d. at 45 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
248. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 16, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
249. Id. at 10, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
250. See id. at 16-17, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
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pay her rent is misplaced. 25 1 According to Sullivan, the landlord
is only required to demonstrate: (1) that Norwood was chroni-
cally late with paying her rent, and as a result, the landlord was
forced to bring repeated nonpayment proceedings within a rela-
tively short period of time; and (2) that Norwood was unjustified
in paying her rent late.252 Moreover, according to Judge Sulli-
van, "[t]here is no requirement that the landlord show good
faith as part of its prima facie case."253
According to Judge Sullivan, the issue on appeal was
whether Norwood's justification for paying her rent late was ad-
equate. 254 "[RIent is due on the first of the month. Rent paid
any other time, whether it be in the same month or a subse-
quent month, is late payment and constitutes a default in the
tenant's obligation under the lease to pay rent by the first of the
month. '255 Judge Sullivan did, however, realize that there are
periods when a tenant's temporary financial woes result in late
rent payment.25 6 So long as these periods do not result in long-
standing and aggravated patterns, they will not constitute a
nuisance unless they are intended to harass the landlord.257
Judge Sullivan stated that in addition to establishing a clear
pattern of aggravated and long-standing late payment of her
rent, Norwood "presented no proof to justify her chronic late
payment of rent."258 Despite the fact that she was gainfully em-
ployed, Norwood testified that she relied on her former hus-
band's monthly alimony check to pay her rent.25 9 The Civil
Court refused to allow any inquiry into Norwood's employment
or any other source of her income or assets. 260 Nonetheless,
Judge Sullivan adopted the view of the dissent at the Appellate
Term that since Norwood did not lack income from other
sources, she could not be permitted to claim that her late rent
251. See id. at 16, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
252. See id.
253. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 17, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
254. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 17, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 18, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
259. See Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 18, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
260. See id. at 18, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
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payment was solely due to her former husband's alimony pay-
ments being occasionally late. 261 In short, Judge Sullivan's po-
sition is: "[flinancial inability to pay does not justify the chronic
late payment of rent."262
III. The New York Court of Appeals Decision in the Lead
Case: Sharp v. Norwood263
On May 8, 1997, in a brief opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the majority's opinion and stated that the
landlord failed to prove his nuisance claim.264 To prevail on a
theory of nuisance, the court wrote, the landlord was "required
to establish that [Norwood's] conduct 'interfere[d] with the use
or enjoyment' of his property."265 According to the court, the
landlord offered no evidence to demonstrate that Norwood's late
payment of the rent amounted to such an interference. 266 Offer-
ing no further rationale for its conclusion, the court held that
the landlord's holdover petition was properly dismissed by the
Civil Court.267
The court pointed out, based on the current set of facts, that
the landlord might have prevailed if he based the underlying
holdover proceeding on the theory that "[Norwood] violated a
'substantial obligation' of her tenancy" rather than on a nui-
sance theory.268 However, the court pointed out that the land-
lord did not base his holdover proceeding on this alternative
ground.269 Thus, when faced solely with a holdover proceeding
based on the theory of nuisance, the court declined to accept the
fact that the landlord, in its attempt to collect the rent, was re-
peatedly compelled to bring nonpayment proceedings against
261. See id. at 19, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
262. Id. at 17, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (citing Fishel v. Oakley, NYI, May 23
1990, at 25, col 3 [App Term, 2nd and 11th Judicial Districts]).
263. 89 N.Y.2d 1068, 1069, 681 N.E.2d 1280, 1281, 659 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835
(1997).
264. See id. at 1069, 681 N.E.2d at 1281, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
265. Id. (citing Copart Indus. Inc., v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41
N.Y.2d 564, 568, 362 N.E.2d 968, 970, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (1977)).
266. See Sharp, 89 N.Y.2d at 1069, 681 N.E.2d at 1281, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
267. See id.
268. Id. (citing N.Y. RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS § 2204(a)(1) (McKinney
1997); Carol Management Corp., v. Mendoza, 197 A.D.2d 687, 687, 602 N.Y.S.2d
941, 942 (1993)).
269. See Sharp, 89 N.Y.2d at 1069, 681 N.E.2d at 1281, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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Norwood.270 Finally, the court stated that it was not deciding
"whether chronic late payment or nonpayment of rent, when
combined with aggravating circumstances, could ever support
an eviction proceeding for a nuisance."271
IV. Analysis
As is typically the case when dealing with a claim grounded
on the theory of nuisance, "the question presented . . .is one
which is a fact-laden determination."272 On the set of facts
presented in Sharp, the Court of Appeals had the opportunity to
set forth a bright line rule. The court ran from its opportunity
to formulate an instructive approach to delineate when chroni-
cally late rent payments constitute a nuisance warranting the
tenant's eviction, ruling instead that under this set of facts, a
nuisance could not be found.27 3 Sharp leaves landlords guess-
ing. Specifically, Sharp leaves lower courts arbitrarily adding
obstacles for landlords to overcome. 274 In an area so murky, a
procedure is needed which would put tenants on notice and
which would provide guidance for landlords who contemplate
the eviction of tenants who consistently breach their duty to pay
rent in a timely fashion. To date, no other jurisdictions have
faced the dilemma whether (and when) chronically late rent
payments constitute a nuisance. A bright line rule would have
offered guidance for both New York state courts and foreign
courts which struggle in this tremulous area.
A half century ago, the state of New York adopted legisla-
tion aimed at protecting tenants against landlords who, because
of the scarcity of housing, had the power to drastically and arbi-
trarily inflate rents. 275 Before adoption of that law, if the tenant
could no longer afford the rent demanded by the landlord, the
tenant was free to seek alternative housing.276 In the face of a
housing shortage, a landlord had no shortage of tenants willing
to pay rent. This legislation, in effect, terminated the tradi-
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Sharp, 223 A.D.2d at 13, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (Mazzarelli, J., concurring).
273. See Sharp, 89 N.Y.2d 1068, 681 N.E.2d 1280, 659 N.Y.S.2d 834.
274. See id.
275. See supra Part II.C.
276. See supra Part II.C.
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tional landlord and tenant bargaining norms.27 7 It was at this
juncture that the New York Legislature expressly left it to the
courts to interpret this legislation. 278
In affirming Sharp, the court re-announced its half century
old duty to ensure that tenants are adequately protected
against landlords. 279 Even today, the City of New York is
plagued by a scarcity of affordable housing accommodations.280
In reaching its determination to prohibit the landlord from
evicting Norwood, the court undoubtedly took the City's hous-
ing shortage into consideration. 28' Norwood occupied her rent-
controlled apartment for over thirty-three years. 28 2 Nuisance
requires a court to weigh and balance the particular facts in
each case. 28 3 Obviously, the court found the scale tipped in
favor of the landlord in Frank when it affirmed the eviction of
an 80-year-old tenant from his Central Park West apartment.28 4
New York courts have consistently held that in order for a
landlord to prevail in a summary holdover proceeding based on
a nuisance theory, the landlord must demonstrate that it was
compelled to bring numerous nonpayment proceedings against
the allegedly breaching tenant in a relatively short period of
time.28 5 This is but one burden the landlord must meet. The
landlord must also demonstrate that the "tenant's nonpayment
[of the rent] was willful, unjustified, without explanation, or ac-
companied by an intent to harass the landlord."28 6 In Sharp,
however, as Judge Sullivan pointed out in his dissent, the court
announced yet another burden for the landlord to overcome. 28 7
This new burden requires the landlord to demonstrate that it
brought the requisite number of nonpayment proceedings in a
relatively short period of time and that it brought the proceed-
ings "in good faith to collect outstanding rent and not as a pre-
277. See supra Parts II.A., II.C.
278. See supra Part II.C.
279. See supra Part II.C.
280. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
284. See supra Part II.D.
285. See supra Part II.E.
286. 25 t' Reality Associates v. Griggs, 150 A.D.2d 155, 156, 540 N.Y.S.2d 434,
435 (1st Dep't 1989); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 206-07 and accompanying text.
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tense to meet the definition of nuisance for the purposes of
bringing a holdover action."288
As for the first burden, the record in Sharp, according to
the court, unquestionably demonstrated that the landlord
brought two such nonpayment proceedings against Norwood.
2 9
Since neither of those proceedings made it to trial, the First De-
partment believed that the sole reason the landlord commenced
the nuisance eviction proceedings was to squeeze himself within
the established guidelines for bringing a holdover proceeding
grounded in nuisance. 290 As a result, the court held that the
landlord failed to meet this first burden.291
In Griggs, eleven nonpayment proceedings were com-
menced. 292 In Greene, three nonpayment proceedings were com-
menced. 293 In Sawyer, nine nonpayment proceedings were
commenced. 294 The number of nonpayment proceedings com-
menced in Griggs, Greene and Sawyer was found to be satisfac-
tory.295 For nearly an entire decade, however, Norwood, on
average, paid her rent seventeen days after it was due.
296
Clearly the landlord had ample opportunity to bring additional
nonpayment proceedings. 297 However, because no "magic
number" of nonpayment proceedings exists, 298 this requirement
appears to be merely a prerequisite and not an absolute
requirement.
To overcome the second burden, the landlord is required to
demonstrate either that: (1) Norwood willfully paid her rent
late; (2) Norwood was unjustified in paying her rent late; (3)
Norwood lacked an explanation for paying her rent late; or (4)
that Norwood intended to harass the landlord by paying her
rent late.299 What result, however, if Norwood willfully refused
288. Sharp v. Norwood, 223 A.D.2d 6, 8, 643 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1st Dep't 1996);
see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part II.E.
296. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 239-40 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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to pay her rent until the landlord abated a nuisance interfering
with her use and enjoyment,300 but later learned that the land-
lord was not obligated and could not abate the nuisance? Will
Norwood's willful refusal to pay her rent then be unjustified?
For example, suppose that from Norwood's apartment window
she witnessed a neighbor in the same building engaging in
nudity and sexual acts in his apartment. Nearly one hundred
years ago, New York courts held the landlord liable to abate
this offensive conduct. 301 Today, however, New York courts
have held the opposite.302 Perhaps Cole Porter had this in mind
when he wrote: "In olden days a glimpse of stocking was looked
on as something shocking but now God knows, anything
goes."30 3 Nonetheless, would the landlord prevail where Nor-
wood thought she was justified in withholding the rent but was,
in fact, mistaken?
In any event, the Sharp court determined that Norwood
had a valid explanation for consistently paying her rent late.30 4
The record stated that despite the fact that she was gainfully
employed, Norwood waited until her former husband's alimony
checks cleared before she paid the rent.30 5 As previously men-
tioned, nuisance law requires courts to weigh and balance the
particular facts in each case.306 In attempting to prove that
Norwood lacked an explanation for paying her rent late, the
landlord was estopped from inquiring whether Norwood de-
pended exclusively on her former husband's alimony payments
to pay her rent.30 7 By refusing to probe into either Norwood's
income from her gainful employment or income from other
sources, the court failed to properly weigh the facts presented to
it.308
As indicated above, the landlord still possessed the chance
to prove that Norwood's nonpayment was willful, unjustified, or
300. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
302. See Palais Partners v. Vollenweider, 173 Misc. 2d 8, 660 N.Y.S.2d 272
(Civ. Ct. 1997).
303. COLE PORTER, ANYTHING GOES (RCA Victor 1987).
304. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part III.C.
306. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part III.C.
308. See supra Part III.C.
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accompanied by intent to harass. Although the record is silent,
it can probably be assumed that Norwood's toilet was free from
blockage,30 9 the landlord did not permit Norwood's neighbor's
children to urinate in the public hallways, 310 and the landlord
did not permit Norwood to be assaulted by drunk men in the
building's elevator.311 Clearly, the landlord did not create or ig-
nore any nuisance which would give Norwood an explanation
for refusing to tender her rent in a timely fashion. Thus, it is
clear that the court did not balance the landlord's second bur-
den correctly. To the landlord's chagrin, the court concluded
that the landlord also failed to carry this burden.312
The essential judicial balance 3 3 in cases rooted in nuisance
does not end just yet. Sharp added yet another burden that the
landlord must overcome when attempting to protect his or her
right to use and enjoyment 314 of his or her property. 315 In addi-
tion to showing that he or she commenced numerous nonpay-
ment proceedings and that the tenant's nonpayment was
willful, unjustified, lacking explanation, or harassing in nature,
a landlord must now also demonstrate that he or she com-
menced the nonpayment proceedings against the tenant not as
a pretense to meet the definition of nuisance for the purposes of
bringing a holdover action, but to collect the outstanding rent in
good faith.316 The court, unfortunately, neglected to define
"good faith."317
Out of a possible fifty-three separate occasions, the tenant
in Greene failed to pay his rent on time on all but four of these
occasions.318 Moreover, the tenant often failed to pay any rent
for months at a time.319 One month, in particular, the tenant
failed to pay the rent until thirteen months had elapsed.320
During a four year period, the landlord in Greene commenced
309. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part III.B.
313. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 206-07 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part III.B.
318. See supra note 163-67 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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three nonpayment proceedings and one holdover proceeding.321
Likewise, the landlord in Sawyer, during a period of three and
one half years, was compelled to serve the tenant with nine dis-
possessions for nonpayment of the rent.322 Each dispossession
sought back rent at least two months late. 323 Also, in Griggs,
the landlord was forced to bring eleven nonpayment proceed-
ings over the course of six years.324 The tenants in Greene, Saw-
yer and Griggs were found to have interfered with the use or
enjoyment of the landlord's property.325 Another common
thread is the fact that none of these landlords had to demon-
strate that it brought these proceedings in good faith.3 26 Simi-
larly, none had to persuade the court that he or she did not
commence these actions as a mere pretense to meet the defini-
tion of nuisance.327
In Sharp, the record indicated that the landlord com-
menced two nonpayment proceedings, served eleven three-day
rent demands during a period of seventeen months, and served
forty-four rent demands on Norwood during a nine-year pe-
riod.328 During this nine-year period, Norwood's rent was, on
average, 16.94 days late each month.329 Also during this period,
Norwood failed to pay her rent on time on all but three occa-
sions. 330 Moreover, sometimes Norwood failed to pay her rent
for months at a time. 331 Clearly, the landlord's claim for posses-
sion based on a nuisance theory was not based on mere specula-
tion or overly nervous sensitivities. 332 As is illustrated above,
there were ample opportunities to bring nonpayment proceed-
ings against Norwood, but the Court refused to consider this
fact.
If the court considered the landlord's opportunities to bring
more than the two nonpayment proceedings he actually did
321. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 179 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part II.E.
326. See supra Part II.E.
327. See supra Part II.E.
328. See supra notes 240 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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bring against Norwood, Sharp would have been brought in line
with Greene, Sawyer and Griggs where the landlords brought
more than two nonpayment proceedings and succeeded. But
now, because of Sharp, we have additional requirements for the
landlord to meet and no definition of "good faith." As a result, it
is questionable whether the landlords in Greene, Sawyer and
Griggs would be successful today.
The dissenters would surely agree that Norwood's conduct
of consistently paying her rent late can be likened with allowing
a "pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."333 Clearly, the act
of chronically paying her rent late cannot be viewed as a "right
thing in the wrong place."3 34 The record speaks for itself; Nor-
wood's act of consistently paying her rent late constitutes a nui-
sance to the landlord at all times and in all places. The landlord
clearly commenced the nonpayment proceedings against Nor-
wood to collect the overdue rent in good faith. The court
disagreed.
In short, the Court of Appeals ran from its chance to an-
nounce a test that the lower courts could use as a guideline to
determine when a tenant is committing a nuisance by chroni-
cally paying the rent late. The court should have: (1) considered
prior New York cases on landlord-tenant eviction predicated on
nuisance; (2) understood the differences between the cases; (3)
set forth a guiding principle for nuisance evictions; and, (4) es-
tablished a clear test which could be implemented by lower
courts. A test is needed which will balance the landlord's legal
right to prompt payment of rent against the tenant's reason(s)
for tendering the rent in an untimely fashion. In addition, it is
imperative that a test take into consideration societal influ-
ences such as the existence of a shortage of affordable housing.
A test is needed to guide landlords and the trial courts. The
Court of Appeals decision in Sharp dropped the ball.
The Court should have set forth a bright line test which
would provide guidance to trial courts as they grapple with the
issue of whether and when chronically late rent payments con-
stitute a nuisance. Such a test might include: first, a landlord
must show the existence of a pattern of chronically late rent
333. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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payments; second, a landlord must demonstrate that the tenant
lacked a valid reason (such as the landlord's failure to abate a
nuisance which interfered with the tenant's use and enjoyment
of the premises); third, a landlord must introduce, where appli-
cable, instances of bad faith (such as proof that the tenant's rent
checks were subsequently returned for insufficient funds or that
the tenant owes the landlord for arrearages) on the tenant's
part; fourth, a landlord must prove that he or she brought a
minimum of one nonpayment proceeding per each year of the
tenant's occupancy in an attempt to collect the rent due; and,
last, a trial court must, in turn, balance the effect on the land-
lord if eviction is not granted compared to the effect on the ten-
ant if an eviction is granted.
V. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals decision in Sharp allows the lower
courts to arbitrarily place hurdles in front of landlords who
have a contractual right to collect rent in a timely fashion. Al-
lowing lower courts to create hurdles in an ad hoc manner en-
sures that it will become increasingly more difficult for a
landlord to prevail when it bases its claim to collect late rent on
a theory of nuisance. The rent control and eviction laws were
designed, in part, to protect the public from greedy landlords
who attempt to displace tenants with unconscionable rent in-
creases. The rent control and eviction laws were not designed
to make it difficult for a landlord to collect the rent legally due.
A landlord is responsible to abate a nuisance interfering with
the tenant's peaceful enjoyment of the leased premises. A ten-
ant, too, is responsible to refrain from committing or permitting
a nuisance. The unwarranted withholding of rent payments
when due clearly constitutes a nuisance.
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